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Agency and the Ontology of the 
Corporation 
Christopher M. Bruner* 
The degree to which corporate entities ought to be treated 
like natural entities—i.e., real people—has confounded legal 
theorists since the emergence of the corporate form. As Sir 
Edward Coke memorably put it in his 1614 report on The Case of 
Sutton’s Hospital, “a corporation aggregate of many is invisible, 
immortal, and rests only in intendment and consideration of the 
law.”1 Put differently, the corporation is a legal fiction—and an 
elusive one at that, synonymous with, yet distinct from, its 
various constituents. Though “but one person in law,” as Sir 
William Blackstone would explain in 1765, it is “a person that 
never dies: in like manner as the river Thames is still the same 
river, though the parts which compose it are changing every 
instant.”2 
Modern business corporations remain as ontologically 
complex as they are commercially ubiquitous.3 To be sure, we 
routinely take for granted that corporations can themselves 
undertake many of the commercial activities that people do. 
Corporations can sue and be sued; buy, hold, and sell property; 
enter contracts; borrow and lend money, and so on.4 They can 
also hire agents to act on their behalf5—a critical capacity 
because, as Coke and Blackstone well understood centuries ago, a 
fictional entity cannot act on its own. Indeed, numerous aspects 
                                                                                                     
 * Associate Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University. 
 1. EDWARD COKE, 5 THE REPORTS OF SIR EDWARD COKE, KNT. IN THIRTEEN 
PARTS pt. X, at *32b (Lawbook Exchange 2000) (1826).  
 2. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *456 (Cavendish Publishing 
2001) (1765). 
 3. For further discussion see Christopher M. Bruner, The Enduring 
Ambivalence of Corporate Law, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1385, 1387–95 (2008).  
 4. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 122(2), (4), (13)–(14) (2011). 
 5. Id. § 122(5).  
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of corporate life continue to defy straightforward analogy to our 
own lives. Particularly vexing problems have arisen where 
corporate law intersects with other complex areas of law and 
policy. Prominent and controversial examples in recent years 
have included corporate political speech,6 corporate criminal 
liability,7 and as Christine Shepard’s superb Note explores, the 
corporate entity’s posture vis-à-vis fraud committed by certain of 
its agents, yet undetected by others—specifically, officers cooking 
the books and auditors negligently failing to uncover it.8 In this 
unhappy circumstance, should we treat the corporate entity 
itself—and, therefore, innocent constituencies including public 
shareholders who want to sue on its behalf—as a wrongdoer by 
association with the officers, or as a victim of auditor negligence?  
Determining how we ought to conceptualize the corporation, 
as such, in cases of corporate fraud raises some exceptionally 
thorny doctrinal problems. Whose acts count as “corporate” acts, 
and when? How do the policy aims of agency law relate to those of 
corporate law and other relevant fields? How do we optimally 
calibrate the incentives of those who, in one way or another, act 
on the corporation’s behalf—including officers, directors, and 
outside professionals such as auditors? 
Shepard’s Note presents a clear, thorough, and persuasive 
critique of a muddled case law.9 She argues compellingly that 
courts have widely erred, both in law and in policy, in permitting 
auditors to defend malpractice actions by too readily 
characterizing the corporation itself as a wrongdoer—the so-
called “in pari delicto” defense.  This defense denies a remedy to a 
plaintiff deemed equally at fault, an outcome courts have reached 
by imputing the officer-fraudster’s knowledge to the corporation 
                                                                                                     
 6. E.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S.Ct. 876, 886 
(2010) (holding that the government may not suppress corporate political 
speech).  
 7. E.g., Erik Luna, The Curious Case of Corporate Criminality, 46 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1507 (2009) (exploring “the past, present, and future of corporate 
criminal law”).  
 8. Christine M. Shepard, Corporate Wrongdoing and the In Pari Delicto 
Defense in Auditor Malpractice Cases: A New Approach, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
275 (2011). As Shepard clarifies, an auditor’s duty is not to expose fraud, but to 
perform in accordance with established professional standards. Id. at 277 n.1. 
 9. See id. pt. II.C. 
AGENCY AND THE ONTOLOGY OF THE CORPORATION 357 
under agency law.10 In this comment I briefly review Shepard’s 
analysis, highlighting the important contribution made to the 
relevant legal and policy debates, and discuss further avenues 
that might be explored in operationalizing the novel and sensible 
solution that she proposes.  
 Shepard’s discussion of the current state of the law11 
emphasizes that the in pari delicto defense, on the one hand, and 
imputation under agency law, on the other, arose in different 
settings to further different policy aims. Effectively, in pari 
delicto is to law what the doctrine of unclean hands is to equity, 
favoring the defendant in a case of equal fault. Being historically 
rooted in equity, there is an inevitable imprecision about the in 
pari delicto defense, reflected most obviously in the “public policy” 
safety valve giving courts the ability to deny the defense where 
permitting it would contradict its purpose. As Shepard notes, this 
should preclude the defense where required to “prevent a 
wrongdoer from profiting from his own misconduct.”12 The agency 
doctrine of imputation, on the other hand, deems principals to 
know facts known to their agents in order to allocate most 
efficiently the risks associated with agent misconduct—the idea 
being that principals are typically better positioned to police their 
own agents than are third parties in the marketplace with whom 
those agents transact on their principals’ behalf.13 To be sure, 
imputation itself is subject to exceptions, most notably the 
“adverse interest” exception, but this applies only where the 
agent intends to act “solely” for the benefit of someone other than 
the principal.14 Indeed, this narrow exception to imputation is 
itself subject to an exception (the result being imputation) “when 
necessary to protect the rights of a third party” dealing in good 
faith.15 In this sense, the doctrine of imputation similarly 
                                                                                                     
 10. E.g., Cenco, Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir. 
1982) (holding that the allegedly negligent auditors could invoke imputation as 
a defense when corporate management committed fraud on behalf of the 
corporation).  
 11. See Shepard, supra note 8, pt. II.  
 12. Id. at 293. 
 13. Id. at 280–81. 
 14. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY  § 5.04 (2006). 
 15. Id. § 5.04(a). 
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requires a delicate balancing of the equities.16 Critically, however, 
as Shepard rightly observes, the aims of in pari delicto and 
imputation are entirely unrelated—doubly so, in fact. The in pari 
delicto defense applies where the plaintiff is an equal wrongdoer, 
whereas imputation is not fault-based; the agency analysis 
simply does not turn on whether the principal is a “wrongdoer,” 
as such. Moreover, imputation was developed to deny a principal-
defendant a defense, not to deny a principal-plaintiff a claim.17 
Put differently, imputation was built to deny a shield, not to deny 
a sword.  
As Shepard’s careful analysis of the case law reveals, courts 
have been all over the map in auditor malpractice cases brought 
on behalf of corporations at which fraud occurred, some 
permitting the in pari delicto defense to be raised more liberally, 
while others have been more restrictive—the difference turning 
most conspicuously on the scope of the adverse interest exception 
to imputation. The inconsistency in the case law, Shepard argues, 
has arisen because courts have, by and large, focused on the 
wrong question. The ultimate touchstone for the in pari delicto 
analysis should be whether the corporation was a “wrongdoer” in 
some pertinent respect—an issue to which the agency doctrine of 
imputation may be relevant but is not determinative.18 
Shepard’s analysis of the case law and her clarification of the 
appropriate standard are substantial contributions in themselves. 
She continues, however, building upon this foundation by offering 
a pragmatic and reasonable proposal that follows quite logically 
from her account of the nature of these disputes. Determining the 
appropriate liability exposure for auditors negligently failing to 
detect corporate fraud must turn, to some degree, on the 
boundaries of the corporation itself—specifically, whose acts 
count as “corporate” acts in the relevant sense. To be sure, there 
is some recognition of the core ontological problem in the cases 
but little consistency in addressing it. On one view, the officer-
fraudster’s acts and knowledge are straightforwardly the 
corporation’s acts and knowledge, rendering the in pari delicto 
                                                                                                     
 16. See Shepard, supra note 8, at 281–83, 286. 
 17. Id. at 324–27. 
 18. Id. at 316–18, 324–27. 
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defense readily available to auditors.19 On another view, however, 
the auditors themselves ought to be treated as “insiders”—agents, 
like officers, who are effectively internal to the corporate 
enterprise when it comes to ensuring the integrity of financial 
statements, and therefore should not benefit from the in pari 
delicto defense via imputation.20  
Perceiving that the problem, in essence, amounts to 
determining what acts—and more specifically, what 
wrongdoing—ought to be treated as “corporate” wrongdoing, 
Shepard proposes a solution that is both doctrinally consistent 
with approaches taken in other corporate disputes, and mindful 
of broader policy concerns regarding the scope of auditor liability. 
Observing that corporate law has already explored the 
relationship between the fiduciary duties of the board—the entity 
responsible for management of the corporation21—and the 
detection and prevention of fraud and other illegal conduct, she 
proposes that we use that preexisting framework as a means of 
conceptualizing “corporate” wrongdoing in auditor malpractice 
cases. Specifically, the monitoring and reporting systems that 
fiduciary duties already effectively require the board to adopt22 
“may,” she suggests, “provide the best yardstick by which to 
measure a corporation’s acts.”23 Her response to the underlying 
ontological problem is elegant and suitably tailored to the context 
at issue—whatever the corporation may “be” (in some 
metaphysical sense) vis-à-vis its agents, we can coherently judge 
whether the corporation itself should be treated as a wrongdoer 
by reference to the quality of its institutionalized efforts to 
prevent and detect wrongdoing by those who work for it. 
While no corporate monitoring system can be perfect, 
Shepard’s approach would strongly reinforce preexisting 
incentives to devise an effective monitoring and reporting 
system—because doing so would help preserve the corporation’s 
                                                                                                     
 19. Id. at 321. 
 20. Id. at 310–13. 
 21. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2011).  
 22. E.g., Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006); In re Caremark Int’l Inc. 
Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).  
 23. Shepard, supra note 8, at 328. 
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ability to sue auditors for malpractice. She acknowledges that 
there is widespread debate regarding the appropriate level of 
liability exposure for “gatekeeper” professionals such as 
auditors—and reason to fear that excessive liability might deter 
them from offering needed services—but rightly notes that there 
are plenty of other levers to pull in seeking to achieve the optimal 
level of liability exposure.24 
Shepard’s proposed solution is a compelling one, and there is 
reason to believe that such an approach could bring clarity, 
consistency, and predictability to an incoherent case law. Her 
proposal effectively amounts to a general conceptual framework, 
however, leaving to future work the precise means of 
implementing it. This is fair enough—particularly given the 
considerable terrain covered, and contribution made, in her 
doctrinal and policy analyses. Accordingly, the thoughts 
expressed in the remainder of this comment should be 
interpreted not as implicit criticism but as taking up the 
conversation that Shepard initiates toward implementation of a 
worthy proposal.  
As noted above, Shepard’s proposed approach to measuring 
corporate wrongdoing in auditor malpractice cases draws upon 
the fiduciary duty-based approach to the board’s monitoring 
obligations set forth in landmark Delaware cases including 
Caremark25 and Stone v. Ritter,26 which require good-faith effort 
to implement adequate monitoring and reporting systems.27 As 
she observes, however, “Delaware courts have set a high hurdle 
for plaintiffs seeking to recover from individual directors.”28 As 
set forth in Caremark, “only a sustained or systematic failure of 
the board to exercise oversight—such as an utter failure to 
attempt to assure a reasonable information and reporting system 
exists—will establish the lack of good faith that is a necessary 
condition to liability.”29 Given the policy aims legitimating the in 
                                                                                                     
 24. Id. at 320–24, 332, 335–37.  
 25. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 
1996). 
 26. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006). 
 27. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.  
 28. Shepard, supra note 8, at 329. 
 29. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971 (emphasis added); see also Ritter, 911 A.2d 
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pari delicto defense—which Shepard does not dispute—and valid 
concerns regarding excessive auditor liability, “evidence of more 
than the mere existence of systems may be desirable” to permit 
corporations at which fraud went undetected to proceed with 
malpractice suits against their auditors.30 She adds that 
measuring fault in the manner proposed “would require a fact-
intensive inquiry,”31 but does not explore how this inquiry might 
work—a nontrivial matter, given that one could readily imagine 
an excessively open-ended inquiry leading directly back to 
simplistic reliance on imputation and the inconsistency across 
jurisdictions that she rightly criticizes.  
In building a doctrinal structure on the framework that 
Shepard proposes, the considerations that factored into the 
Caremark approach would provide a worthy starting point. 
Caremark was itself inspired by an approach taken to assessing 
corporate wrongdoing in another thorny area noted at the 
outset—corporate criminal liability. Then-Chancellor Allen, 
writing in 1996, noted “the potential impact of the federal 
organizational sentencing guidelines on any business 
organization,” concluding that “[a]ny rational person attempting 
in good faith to meet an organizational governance responsibility 
would be bound to take into account this development and the 
enhanced penalties and the opportunities for reduced sanctions 
that it offers.”32 The strength of the incentives created by the 
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines,33 coupled with their 
prominence in the marketplace, rendered it unthinkable to Allen 
that a fiduciary making a good-faith effort to discharge her 
obligations could ignore them. Promulgated in 1991, the 
Guidelines ultimately became a powerful driver in corporate 
compliance program design, further reflecting both market 
familiarity and their practical significance.34  
                                                                                                     
at 369.  
 30. Shepard, supra note 8, at 329. 
 31. Id. at 333. 
 32. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970.  
 33. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 8 (2011). 
 34. Lynn Sharp Paine & Christopher M. Bruner, Legal Compliance 
Programs 1–2 (Harv. Bus. Sch. Pub., note 9-306-014, 2005) (on file with the 
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The Guidelines’ core standard—whether the company has 
“an effective compliance and ethics program”35—might be taken 
as a starting point for developing a standard useful in the in pari 
delicto/imputation context, and the factors identified in the 
Guidelines could in turn provide the starting point for a multi-
factor test reducing the indeterminacy of an unavoidably fact-
intensive inquiry. Factors identified in the Guidelines, for 
example, include establishing “standards and procedures to 
prevent and detect criminal conduct”; a “knowledgeable” board 
that exercises “reasonable oversight” regarding the program; 
designated “high-level personnel” exercising “overall 
responsibility” for the program, while delegating “day-to-day 
operational responsibility” to specific lower-level individuals; 
“reasonable efforts” to prevent those who have engaged in illegal 
or unethical conduct from having “substantial authority” to act 
for the corporation; providing “effective training programs”; 
monitoring, auditing, and evaluating the program, including a 
reporting system available to employees and agents; incentives 
and disciplinary procedures to promote enforcement; and 
appropriate responses to criminal conduct once detected.36 
The potential utility of such an approach is hardly 
diminished by the fact that Caremark itself substantially 
insulates directors from associated liability under corporate law 
for failing to implement such a system. The high hurdle that 
Caremark set before plaintiffs was driven by fear that excessive 
liability might render outside directorships unappealing—
effectively the concern motivating the business judgment rule.37 
While the prospect of substantial auditor liability could raise 
similar concerns, Shepard rightly observes that there are plenty 
                                                                                                     
 35. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(a) (2011) (emphasis 
added).  
 36. Id. § 8B2.1(b)–(c). For additional background on design and 
implementation issues, see Paine & Bruner, supra note 34, at 2–4.  
 37. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971 (“[A] demanding test of liability in the 
oversight context is probably beneficial to corporate shareholders as a class, as 
it is in the board decision context, since it makes board service by qualified 
persons more likely . . . .”); see also Christopher M. Bruner, Good Faith, State of 
Mind, and the Outer Boundaries of Director Liability in Corporate Law, 41 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1131, 1157–59 (2006) (discussing director liability under 
the Caremark decision).  
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of ways to mitigate this risk, including caps, indemnification, and 
proportionate liability.38 Accordingly, the system’s effectiveness 
could remain an appropriate benchmark, more meaningfully 
illuminating the degree of corporate wrongdoing than would mere 
good-faith effort to implement any old system.  
To be sure, other standards measured by different factors 
might do the job even better. The modest purpose of this 
discussion is simply to reinforce what Shepard’s excellent Note 
already amply demonstrates—that a practically and conceptually 
superior approach to the in pari delicto defense in auditor 
malpractice cases is eminently achievable. Shepard supplies the 
framework for such an approach, and courts would do well to take 
up the challenge.  
                                                                                                     
 38. Shepard, supra note 8, at 324, 336–37. Efforts to calibrate auditors’ 
liability exposure in the securities litigation context provide a menu of options. 
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2006) (imposing constraints on private securities 
litigation and associated liability, including a proportionate liability regime). 
